. Studying these works carefully enables us to discern diVerent scholastic "in uences" at work in them, suggesting that the Iberian pattern of interaction between Jewish sages and scholastic philosophy continued up until the gerush and even beyond into the sixteenth century. In particular, speci c Thomist elements can be detected in the later work.
Kanpanton's greatest achievement was the revival of talmudic learning as an important intellectual pursuit of the Iberian Jewish intelligencia, after a period of close to a century during which this pursuit was not highly regarded. It can reasonably be hypothesized that one of the reasons he was so successful in this endeavor was his ability to express talmudic learning in the language of the scholastic philosophical discourse so highly regarded by that very intelligencia and to show that talmudic logic was in many respects comparable to Aristotelian logic or more speci cally Aristotelian linguistic doctrine. His method of interpreting the Talmud became, through his disciples who founded Yeshivot all through the Ottoman Empire, the dominant method of study and interpretation in the Sefardic diaspora for the two centuries following the Expulsion. His little handbook for talmudic interpretation, Darkhe hattalmud [ The Ways of the Talmud] was so in uential that it is quoted almost entire in the sixteenth century Polish halakhic classic, Shnei Luúot Habberit as an illustration of the way that Sefardim study Talmud and a recommendation to the author's Ashkenazi fellows that they follow its example. Kelale Shmuel is an alphabetical encyclopedia of talmudic terminology together with examples of the usage of the terms, drawn from actual texts and some discussion of problems related to the terms and the speci c texts cited. As such, it reveals the systematization and scienti c method so beloved of the Spanish Jews in uenced by scholasticism. However, the most interesting part of the book is the introduction, in which the author sets out a methodology for the study and interpretation of the Talmud, following the theory and practice of 'iyyun. This introduction is together with Darkhe hattalmud itself one of the two most important theoretical documents of the school that are preserved.
Logic and the Perfection of Speech
Several of the most important aspects of 'iyyun can be shown to be applications to talmudic studies of ideas about language and semiotics current in the Arabic logical literature from Al-Farabi and on.
One of the key methodological principles of 'iyyun was to demonstrate that each and every word of the Talmud was necessary. This principle has sometimes been derived by scholars from the talmudic method of interpreting the Mishnah and from the midrashic method of interpreting the Bible. 4 While I do not deny the relevance of these models, the comparisons I will make show that the proximate theoretical sources were rather in scholastic linguistic philosophy. This principle can be organized into several sub-categories, in each case showing the connection with Arabic predecessors.
The key to the method of 'iyyun was the intimate relation of logic and language in the Middle Ages. This connection lies in the fact that one of the major tasks of the logician, perhaps the rst task, is to determine what linguistic signs mean, and in order to do so, one must rst have a theory of how linguistic signs mean. The dominant theory of meaning in scholastic logic is the theory of intentio or mental language. This doctrine has been well summarized by E.J. Ashworth:
It was held that for a spoken or written proposition to have meaning, it had to be subordinated to a mental proposition, and such properties as synonymy and equivocation were explained by means of the relationships between these three types of proposition. If a spoken or written proposition was equivocal, this meant that its tokens could be subordinated to more than one mental proposition. On the other hand, if two diVerent written or spoken propositions were said to be synonymous, this meant they were subordinated to the same mental proposition. A corollary of these claims was, of course, that no mental propositions could properly be called either equivocal or synonymous. All mental propositions were explicit and distinct from one another. . . . Moreover, any written or spoken proposition was supposed to have some mental analogue. 5 This doctrine was crucial in forming the interpretive methodology of 'iyyun, for it leads to an understanding of interpretation as the determination of the relationships of written language to mental language or intention within a text, and it was this understanding which generated the methodology of 'iyyun. That this was indeed the interpretation of meaning held by the 'iyyun can be shown by the following quotation:
Always investigate and search every interpretation which they interpret or explication of a biblical verse or of the language (i.e., the Talmud) to see if it is correct and properly tting from the aspect of the language or the intention or both, for that is the ideal. 6 That is to say: the ideal commentary explains the written language in such a way that it ts perfectly with mental speech, i.e., that no elements of the outer speech have been ignored or distorted in arriving at the explication and that nothing need be supplied that is not, in fact, implied by the language. Moreover, the mental discourse thus hypothesized must be coherent. The ideal is, of course, for both of these conditions to be met fully.
The search for an interpretation of a text which shows that there is a perfect t between outer and inner speech or between written and mental language is implicated in a doctrine that denies that there is systematic redundancy in language. Thus, when Kanpanton introduces his hermeneutic rule that every part and particle of the language must be proven to make an independent non-redundant contribution to the meaning, he does so in the following way:
A great principle of 'iyyun is that you must be very exacting with the language and make great eVort if there is any super uous language or duplication of intention, . . . and, moreover, be very exacting with any change in the language . . . from subject to subject [asking] why is it? And you shall investigate and search diligently to bring out meaning from all of the language in such a way that every word and every particle will signify something new not understood from all that came before.
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There are, in fact, three types of redundancy listed by Kanpanton here. The rst two are self-explanatory. "Super uous language" must mean linguistic signs within the text, which are apparently unnecessary to signify the intention of the text. "Apparently" is the crucial word here, for, in fact, by the doctrine I have cited above, "any term which appeared in a written or spoken proposition was supposed to have some mental analogue." Therefore, the interpreter must "make great eVort" if there appear to be any terms that do not have such analogues, interpreting them as well, and showing how the meaning would suVer were they absent. Similarly, when the text seems to repeat itself ("duplicate its intention"), one must nd a way to excise the apparent redundancy. So far, so good, but what is the meaning of "be exacting" with any change in the language, and what has that to do with super uity or redundancy? As we learn from the interpretive practice of Kanpanton's disciples, what is meant here is that when diVerent language is used in diVerent passages apparently to express the same meaning, one must "be exacting" and show that in fact they have diVering intentions behind them. That is to say, Kanpanton rejects the possibility of complete synonymy, not only in mental language, but even with regard to written and spoken language, for this would lead to a defect (super uity) in the linguistic system, which is deemed to be perfect.
The doctrine of non-super uity in language, on both the discourse and the systemic levels belongs to an important philosophical tradition. Looking just at sources that were probably well known to Kanpanton, we nd the fourteenth century Provençal logician, R. Joseph Ibn Kaspi claiming, "In general, nearly all synonyms have a diVerence in meaning between them, when examined exactingly." 8 Similarly, Kaspi's countryman, R. Moshe Narbonni claims, "Now synonyms are not employed in the demonstrative sciences," and uses this as an exegetical principle, by which he explains that when AlGazzali says "ignorance and error" he must mean two diVerent things. 9 In truth, these are slightly diVerent positions, Kaspi denying that there is any synonymy at all, while Narbonni seems to say that it exists but is avoided in scienti c writing. Either view is suYcient to explain Kanpanton's doctrine.
The second sort of redundancy too was rejected on sound logical grounds. First of all, as we have already seen, it was a generally held principle that any term in written or oral speech had its analogue in mental speech. Kanpanton refers to this principle when he says, "Every word and every particle must signify something new." Moreover, it was a commonly held view that logic is a science of language, the function of which is to teach one to use language in an exact manner. Indeed, in Hebrew, before being called higgayon (which also means speech), logic was called úokhmat haddibbur, literally, scientia sermocinalis. The connection between logic and the perfection of speech is well established in the thought of Maimonides, a major source for Jewish scholasticism. Let us see then how Maimonides de nes "dibbur," and how he, thereby, relates language to logic:
The word "dibbur " is a homonymous term by imposition of the ancient peoples, which signi es three intentions.
The rst is that faculty, by which man is distinguished, with which he conceives concepts (intelligibles) and learns sciences and distinguishes between the contemptible and the appropriate. This intention is also called "the faculty of speech" or "the speaking soul."
The second intention is the concept itself, already conceived by the man. This intention is called "the inner speech."
The third intention is the utterance in speech of the intention (concept) impressed upon the soul. This intention is also called "the outer speech."
11
We see, according to Maimonides, that language is the product of an innate capacity for articulate speech, "the speaking soul." Now, this innate faculty is, in fact, none other than the faculty of reason, for it diVerentiates humans and enables them to learn and distinguish what is correct from the incorrect. Moreover, by virtue of this faculty, concepts are "already" conceived in "inner (mental) speech," prior to their formulation in "outer speech," talking and writing. It follows then that "outer speech," a product of the rational faculty, ought to be made so that it will be a perfect representation of logical form. This indeed, according to Maimonides, is the work of logic, "the science of speech:" This statement of Ibn Sid's teaches us three things: 1) that the method of 'iyyun had its roots in the scholastic theory of meaning, particularly in its Maimonidean-Farabian formulation; 2) that 'iyyun as an interpretive method follows from the assumption that one trained in logic can use outer speech so as to make it a perfect signi er of inner speech, with no extra or missing linguistic signs for the expression of the inner speech; and 3) that the authors of the talmudic texts are such logicians, and therefore one can apply these canons of interpretation to their language.
The Concept of Understanding by Sub-audition.
One of the outstanding methods of talmudic interpretation developed by Yitzhaq Kanpanton was the method known as sebara mibbaúutz, which I will translate here, for reasons that will become apparent, "understanding by sub-audition." Here is the rabbi's description of the force of this technique: The sebara mibbaúutz is then that which would have been understood by the commentator from the language of the Torah or of the Mishnah without the necessity for an interpretive intervention on the part of the tannaim or amoraim. The origin of the term, itself, however, is not totally established. I would like to propose that the sebara mibbaúutz is a calque on an Arabic logical term, ultimately going back to a Greek term in the commentaries on Aristotle. In that literature, we nd the Greek term ejvyen in the sense of that which is not expressed explicitly in language, because it is understood by the intelligence of the hearer or reader without a need for it to be expressed. So we nd it used in Ammonius's commentary on Aristotle:
What is required in a modal proposition is not merely a verb which includes the copula, but the copula itself, either explicit or supplied to the proposition from outside by subaudition (ejvyen th protasei upakonomenou), for we say: either "It is possible that Socrates will go," or "It is possible that Socrates will be a musician" with the copula expressed. But we can also express these propositions without the copula thus: "Possible that Socrates will go." We hold that in the latter case, the copula is understood. 14 We nd here that Ammonius uses precisely the term "from outside" to refer to a linguistic sign that does not need to be expressed in the language in order for the sentence to be understood. It is not a diYcult step to imagine a talmudic thinker inquiring why is it ever used if it need not be. An even more exact correspondence to our usage is found in Al-Farabi, who frequently uses the expression a ¶marahu wa-fahimahu min khˆrij. As Farabi's editor, F.W. Zimmerman remarks, "min khˆrij presumably is an exegetical concept, and as such occurs in a set phrase literally rendering the Greek in the glosses of the Baghdad Organon."
15 As Zimmerman further explains:
The expression a ¶marahu wa-fahimahu min khˆrij [to supply in the mind and understand it from the outside] doubly translates ( rst idiomatically, then literally) ejvyen th protasei upakonomenou ti an expression frequently found . . . in the Greek commentaries.
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In short, the Greek ejvyen calqued by the Arabic min khˆrij provides an exact source for Yitzhak Kanpanton's uses of mibbaúutz. The correspondence is even more exact in the case of interpreting a commentator, such as Rashi, for then the question is, given that I would have understood a given point mibbaúutz, because it is implied in the language, then why did Rashi have to tell me it explicitly. It is, of course, most signi cant and interesting to see that the term, once appropriated takes on a life of its own and develops several variant meanings, among them some that are used in Ashkenazi pilpul as well. 
The Use of Falsity as the Royal Road to Truth
Certainly one of the most misunderstood elements of 'iyyun already in its own time was the insistence on producing false interpretations of the talmudic text only to disprove them in the end. This was misunderstood by contemporaries and near contemporaries as a type of merely academic show of prowess and roundly attacked by such gures as the author of 'Alilot Debarim. This method had, however, several sound bases in the logical thought of the later Middle Ages. The rst has to do with the very reason that interpretation is necessary in Kanpanton's view. In a key passage, he states (p. 57):
Alternatively, the commentator will interpret the matter, in order to exclude another opinion or another interpretation, which would be possible in the potentiality of the language, for according to the simple meanings of the words and the syntax, it would be possible to err and entertain another view, and in order to guard against it and repulse it from the minds of the me'ayyenim, since in truth it is a falsehood, for that reason he interprets.
The key phrases in Kanpanton's explication are all of them couched in the language of Hebrew scholasticism. The most important phrase is "possible in the potentiality of the language, bekoaú hallashon, that is to mean, that which we would have understood by ourselves from the language without the necessity for it to be expressed, or for that which we would have understood erroneously from the language itself before the commentators disabuse us of our error. This phrase, "potential in the language" is accordingly very similar in force to sebara mibbaúutz. It can also develop the sense of that which is implied in the language, as in the following usage of Shmuel Ibn Sid, "A Mishnah or baraita which he could have objected from using that which is explicit in the language, but instead used that which is implicit," that is, in the more usual terminology of talmudic scholarship, the diyyuq. And indeed, bekoaú and bepo'al are used in both Hebrew and Arabic [bi-l-kuwwa bi-l-'l ] logical writings to mean, "explicit" and "implicit."
As stated above in the quotation from Ashworth, equivocation in the Middle Ages is de ned as a single verbal proposition being subordinated to more than one mental proposition. This generally results from the polysemous nature of terms within the proposition. Now, for most medieval semanticists-Bacon is perhaps an exception-the meanings of polysemous or homonymous terms are xed, that is to say, they have been xed by an "imposition" or a series of impositions on the part of the ancient peoples. (Remember the explanation of the homonymy of dibbur in the above citation from Maimonides.) Therefore, a given proposition in a text has a limited number of possible interpretations, of which the parameters are the various possibilities which are potential in each of its terms. One of the functions of determining possible false readings of the text, then, is to show the necessity for the comment of the interpreter as excluding those false readings which exist in the potential of the language.
Kanpanton's doctrine is explicitly connected (by his terminology) to the scholastic analysis of sophisms or fallacies. His use of the terms "err" and "to guard against" in the above citation point in this direction, for both are terms of art of the Hebrew literature on sophisms. Most revealing, however, is Kanpanton's use of the term sophisms or fallacies (hata'ot) to mean the false interpretations of a passage rejected by the canonical commentators. Sophisms were analyzed by Aristotle into two types: "sophisms in speech" and those "out of speech," or in the terminology of Hebrew scholasticism hata'ot "asher bammillot and hata'ot "asher ba'inyanim. Now, it is quite clear that Kanpanton is referring to sophisms of speech, de ned as the falla-cious acceptance of one of the possible signi cations of an equivocal expression, when in fact, another is correct. By referring to the incorrect, rejected interpretations as hata'ot, he is drawing an analogy between the commentator and logician, whose common job is to teach people to "guard themselves" from the snares of seductive fallacy.
As we have seen, Maimonides, following Al-Farabi, de ned the purpose of logic as giving, "rules common to all languages, by which outer speech is guided toward what is correct, and guarded from error yiÒmerehu min hatta'ut." It is hardly surprising, therefore, that what a commentator does is referred to in all branches of pilpul by the root shmr, e.g., Rashi nishmar mizze, and the pilpulistic method of analyzing commentaries is called universally derek hashshmirot.
We can see now that the setting up of false interpretations is an integral part of the system of thought and interpretation of R. Yitzhak and his follower. These false interpretations are required both to show why it was necessary for a commentator to comment at all, by showing the sophisms possible in the text, and also to serve as proof for the ineluctability of his interpretation. The lengths gone to to show the plausibility of the false interpretations served the rst purpose, for if there be no true causa apparentia, there is no true fallacy, hence no need to interpret. Moreover, it is necessary to eliminate all possible sophisms in order to prove that only one interpretation is possible and therefore correct. Dialectical sophistry is thus conceived of as the only way to achieve truth and certainty in exegesis. As Kanpanton remarks, "the truth cannot be known, except through its opposite."
This view was not merely an eccentricity of talmudists. The fteenthcentury Spanish Jewish philosopher and logician, Abraham Shalom, articulates it as well when he says:
A man is not called a hero of wisdom, until he can demonstrate a proposition two ways, once positively and once negatively, for a matter is only known through its opposite.
The ultimate seriousness of this philosophy can be shown by citing two contemporaneous texts. The rst, by R. Yitzhak Aboab, claims that God himself uses the method of sophisms to teach humans the truth, i.e., he explains by this principle the age-old question of why the Mishnah enunciates wrong opinions together with correct ones:
All of them were given by the same shepherd (Eccl. 12). He wants to say that most often we understand a matter well only via its opposite, and we understand it from its opposite; and, therefore, the Holy One, Blessed be He, wished to give us the diVering opinions, so that when we arrived at the truth, we would understand it clearly. 19 The necessity of dealing in falsehood, of setting up and knocking down fallacies, is a feature of the human condition. Only one to whom truth is vouchsafed by revelation can escape it. Another of Kanpanton's disciples, R. Yoseph Taitazak, expresses it beautifully:
The in uence of blessed God was so great upon Adam that he knew the truth without struggle or eVort, and everything was before him like a set table. As for primordial Adam, since the truth grew by itself, there was not need to weed out and cut down the false divisions, for they were cut down of themselves. 20 We see clearly, once more, that a major principle of talmudic interpretation of Yitzhak Kanpanton is simply a basic epistemological principle of his age brilliantly applied to the discipline of talmudic hermeneutics.
"Conception, Judgment and Ordering" in Kelale Shmuel
In Kelale Shmuel, we also nd elements that are not derived from Kanpanton but are a direct continuation of much the same cultural pattern. I believe that this document, despite its rather arcane subject matter, is a cultural monument of very great interest, which testi es to the continued fruitfulness of inter-religious intellectual exchange on the Iberian Peninsula in the very waning of Jewish life there, that is, just before the expulsions from both Spain and Portugal at the end of the fteenth century. Since it was produced in Safed after the expulsions and was enormously in uential in the following generations, it testi es as well to the eVectivity of that Iberian cultural openness in the intellectual life of the Sefardic diaspora as well.
Moreover, the Iberian rabbis and their Sefardic descendants were not only open to Arabic in uences. Christian scholasticism also had major eVects on the development of their philosophy of interpretation. One of the most strikingly speci c instances of scholastic in uence on Ibn Sid comes right at the very beginning of the work, where he de nes 'iyyun as being composed of three elements, called by him, tziyyur, 'immut, and siddur, conception, judgment, and ordering (1):
Know that any me'ayyen of any subject which comes to mind must think and be exact in three categories. The rst category is with regard to conception. The second category is with regard to judgment. The third category is with regard to order.
As for the conception, It is known that words signify intentions which are in the soul. . . . Afterwards you must perform a second investigation into the language with regard to the 'immut, which is the second category, and you will investigate and think, if the intention in the tziyyur of these words is true or false. . . . After you must perform a third investigation with respect to the third category, which is the siddur . . . and investigate with regard to order, whether the words are ordered in a true siddur [or not]. Now the rst two of these terms are very well known from the Hebrew tradition of scholastic logic. They are, as shown by H.A. Wolfson, calques of the Arabic terms, tatzawwar and tatzdiq, which were also calqued into the Latin scholastic tradition as conceptio or formatio and des, veri catio and others. Virtually all works of Hebrew logic in the middle ages begin with the statement that the subject of logic is divided into these two parts. To take but one example, thus begins the standard work, Kol Melekhet Hahiggayyon (Riva-diTrento, 1559):
All theses which one desires to know in all the mental disciplines are in two parts-the tziyyuri and the 'immuti. The tziyyur is the nature of the thing itself, or rather that which he thinks is its nature, and it is generally asked about with the question "what.". . . . The 'immut is the proof or disproof of the proposition . . . and it is generally asked about with the question "if."
There is, therefore, no question that the source of Ibn Sid's tziyyur and 'immut are to be found in the general Aristotelian tradition of the Middle Ages. The question is only, therefore, what is the origin of Ibn Sid's third division, siddur, "order," namely the investigation of the order of discourse. The answer, it seems, may be found in the Proem to Thomas's commentary on the De Interpretatione which opens:
There is a twofold operation of the intellect, as the Philosopher says in III De Anima. One is the understanding of simple objects, that is, the operation by which the intellect apprehends just the essence of a thing alone; the other is the operation of composing and dividing. There is also a third operation, that of reasoning, by which reason proceeds from what is known to the investigation of things that are unknown.
It is clear from the form of this passage that Thomas regarded the third operation, ratiocination, as an innovation with respect to the pure Aristotelian tradition, and, in fact, as mentioned above, so it seems to be. There seems to be, therefore, a clear prima facia case for regarding the three-fold division of investigation or 'iyyun in Ibn Sid as having been derived or in uenced by the Thomistic tradition. However, this identi cation is not wholly unproblematic, for Thomas is speaking of the process of reasoning from the known to the unknown, while Ibn Sid speaks of the order of words in the sentence and the order of topics in a text as the subject of the third category. We must address ourselves to this diVerence an attempt to bridge it for our argument of in uence to be acceptable. Moreover, through the process of bridging itself we will be able to more adequately de ne the nature and source of scholastic in uence on 'iyyun.
The rst step is that Thomas, himself, in various places, adds to the above description of the third operation, the term discurrere, discourse, as in the following sentence from the introduction to his commentary on the Posterior Analytics:
Tertius vero actus rationis est secundun id quod est proprium rationis, scilicet discurrere ab uno in aliud.
The third act of the mind is according to what is suitable to the mind, that is discourse from one thing to another. Now, while it is clear that Thomas is still speaking of the process of deduction, the issue of the order of discourse is more prominent here, already. We have evidence that Thomas was indeed understood thus. In the curriculum of the University of Alcala, we nd the study of logic divided into three areas: Simple Awareness, Judgment, and Discourse. It seems, therefore, that in the wake of the Thomists this had become a commonplace of Iberian intellectual culture, and it is this commonplace that is re ected in Ibn Sid's division.
Finally, it may be remarked that Thomas's own de nition of this "third operation of the intellect" was too restricted, because of his commitment to an exclusively deductive, Aristotelian discourse. Ibn Sid, who wishes to apply the three-fold division of 'iyyun to a textual discipline would have found it necessary in any case to rede ne the analysis of discourse, as being the study of the movement from one sentence to the next, whether they are the terms of a deductive argument or not. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that his de nition of the third operation of 'iyyun would have been more satisfactory had he included something like the necessary ordering of the refutations and resolutions of the Talmudic pericope, an omission all the more surprising since this type of 'iyyun is very prominent in all the actual interpretive work of his school.
We are thus left with some questions about the formulation of the de nition of Ibn Sid's third division, but the fact of its scholastic origin is not, therefore, made less plausible. As a nal support for this contention, I should like to adduce a further parallel between his text and Thomas's De Interpretatione:
Kelale Shmuel
Be careful to precede your 'iyyun of tziyyur rst, and then the immut and after that the siddur, for the necessity of prior knowledge of [one of these] will force the priority of its 'iyyun, and this is because knowledge of the intention of the language is necessary for knowledge of its judgment, and knowledge of its judgment is a prior necessity for knowledge of its ordering.
Thomas
The rst of these operations is ordered to the second, for there cannot be composition and division unless things have already been apprehended simply. The second, . . . in turn, is ordered to the third, for clearly we must proceed from some known truth to which the intellect assents in order to have certitude about something not yet known.
I believe that this comparison strengthens my argument in three ways. First of all is the coincidence of this placement of this statement of the necessary ordering at the very beginning of the two texts.
Secondly, the very incoherence of Ibn Sid's arguments suggests that he is borrowing a topos. For, since his formulation of the operation of siddur is that one is studying the order of the topics considered in a text, it is not necessary that it follow upon proof of the truth or falsity of the judgments. In fact, in the actual commentaries of Ibn Sid's predecessor (and father-in-law), R. Yitzhaq Aboab, this is the rst subject treated. Ibn Sid, it seems, has therefore, modi ed the order of study, in order to conform formally to the topos of the ordering of the three operations of the intellect with respect to each other. Finally, and this is perhaps, most signi cant, Thomas, himself, is here discussing the order to justify Aristotle's ordering of three of his works one to the other:
Since logic is called rational science it must direct its consideration to the things that belong to the three operations of reason we have mentioned. Accordingly, Aristotle treats those belonging to the rst operation of the intellect, i.e., those conceived by simple understanding, in the book, Praedicamentorum; those belonging to the second operation, i.e., aYrmative and negative enunciation in the book Peri Hermeneias; those belonging to the third operation in the book Priorum. . . . And since the three operations of reason are ordered to each other so are the books.
This forms, of course, a perfect parallel to Ibn Sid's requirement that we, "Say, for example, that he might have placed Chapter Shenaim Ohazim before Chapter Elu Metsiot," and then, of course, demonstrate why this is not so and the present order is proper and necessary. There is no question that Ibn Sid is referring to the same logical tradition which Thomas is using as well and since this is an aspect of logical theory which does not belong to the common scholastic tradition of Moslems, Christians, and Jews but to a particular Iberian Christian Scholasticism, it is equally clear that Ibn Sid and his teachers in Spain were conversant with the best of logical thought of their time and applied it in their theory and practice of talmudic interpretation. This should not, of course, be taken as evidence for a derivativeness in their tradition but rather for their desire to apply the best thought of their times to the study of Torah, both to understand the Torah better and to show that the Talmud is not inferior in its logical to any production of the Aristotelian tradition. We have here in the 'iyyun, inspired in Spain and carried on in all of the Sefardic diaspora, what may be called without hesitation a truly scienti c approach to the study of Written and Oral Torah.
Towards a New Model of Jewish Cultural Poetics
Most "Science of Judaism" research is carried out under a paradigm of the Jews as a separate cultural entity whose presence in other cultures is abnormal (from the point of view of Jewish existence). Such interaction between Jewish and circumambient culture as I have documented here can then only be accounted for as in uence from the surroundings. This paradigm is a carry-over, I would claim, from a Central and East European cultural situation and is even exaggerated from that perspective. A more appropriate model, certainly for the study of Jewish culture in Mediterranean societies, is that of the polysystem, studying the ways in which speci cally Jewish cultural practices, such as Talmud study, interact with other signifying practices in which Jews and others are involved together.
The concept of the polysystem, a product of the "Tel-Aviv" school of poetics sees culture (and the products of culture) not as a closed signifying system but as the interaction at one and the same time of diVerent signifying practices and systems that are all current within the culture. 21 This dynamic is what allows for cultural change and renewal, for the diVerent systems within the culture interpenetrate and modify each other. An excellent example of this process from an area entirely diVerent from what we are studying here would be the way that jazz developed in American culture out of the interaction between American and African musical traditions and ultimately fructi ed even the practice of "classical" music-making in America, such as in George Gershwin's work. This dynamic is not understood on polysystem theory as a special case but as the typical and ever-present process of cultural creation and development.
Coming closer to home, the examples of such Sefardic giants as the Naggid and Maimonides come quickly to mind. It would be extremely misleading were we to speak in their cases of Islamic or Spanish in uences on their work. They are Spaniards contributing to and participating in Ibero-Arabian culture as fully and as importantly as any other gures in medieval Spanish history. At the same time, much of their cultural practice is speci cally Jewish in content, whether halakhic, hermeneutic, theological, or poetic. In order for us to see the one part of their work as authentic and Spanish and the other part as Jewish work in uenced by Spanish culture, we have to schizophrenize them, split them into two distinct personalities, as it were. There is, of course, not the slightest shred of evidence for such split personalities in either the Naggid or the Rambam. Rather, the model of polysystems allows us to see that diVerent signifying systems that co-occur within culture interpenetrate each other in entirely expectable (and indeed to a certain extent predictable) ways.
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This is true, whether the practitioners of the culture are its great gures, as in these two examples, or whether they are lesser or even quite insigni cant gures. The continuation of this cultural pattern by the later Iberian Jews as well, and indeed its elaboration into areas of cultural practice that to the best of our knowledge had not been developed by earlier Spanish Jews, should be considered as a survival of the particular polysystemic structure that the Jews participated in in Spain. Moreover, there is no reason to see it as abnormal within Jewish history. All Jewish sub-cultures can be understood as sub-systems of the general cultures where the Jews lived. Of course, there will be a typology of such Jewish sub-cultures as more or less integrated with other sub-cultures, but in any case having just as much right to the name of culture as the others. This is true of any cultural polysystem; the sub-systems will be more or less interactive with each other. One of the most relevant factors in the typology will be the question of language-use. Obviously Jews using the culture-language current where they live will be more integrated in the polysystem than Jews who use Hebrew exclusively as a culture language. Be that as it may, it seems to me that the cultural pattern of Iberian Jewry and late-Iberian Jewry and even into the post-exilic period can fruitfully be adopted as a precursor for our own practice of cultural integration as Jews in Western culture where our general and Jewish cultural practice interact in similar ways in the university or even in the modern yeshiva.
Appendix: The Introduction to Kelale Shmuel
Said Shmuel Ibn Sidilio: It has entered my heart to make this collection, which contains no novellae for reading, but which I col-lected for myself, in order to relieve myself of the trouble of searching, and I took from the books, from here and from there, any utterance or principle, which my soul delights while learning it. For after extreme age has descended upon me, and also, because of my sins, the light of my eyes has left me, I am not able to go and search for that which my heart desires. For this reason, I have collected here principles for the gemara, which are a vade mecum to the method of 'iyyun. 23 [Some of ] these principles are of the canons by which the Torah is interpreted, which were transmitted at Sinai, and [others are] from joining together places in the gemara and in the commentaries to the gemara and the rabbis. And in our time, a sage of the Maghreb arranged them into sections and chapters, and I have gathered them here to complete the composition and to ease the trouble of searching. Some I have learned from my teachers and some from my pupils, and for what I have collected and labored for this work, I have called on the name of God for help.
Kelale Shmuel teaches that aside from Him, be He blessed, there is no reality at all. 24 May the reader not be amazed if he nd some principle enunciated brie y without a reference to a place in the Talmud. And also may he not be amazed if it be enunciated in unbeautiful language, and also may he not be amazed that I have not extensively analyzed the gemara or the principles, for it was my intention to do so and revise it in every possible way, but my sins have interrupted me. They have smitten me and wounded me and made me to sit in darkness and did not allow me to complete it, as was in my heart. Accordingly, I have become reconciled to the shortcomings which are in what I have written, for they do not prevent understanding, for not by virtue of a principle's being brief or in unbeautiful language will its understanding be confuted, for whether it is without a citation or in unbeautiful language its intention may be clear. And behold! One who opposes a blind man is in error, and after him a voice cries out and protests, whether he be young or a fool?.
Introduction. Great is the value of the methods of 'iyyun in the gemara and it commentators. In order to increase the understanding, in this introduction I will place before the reader the way in which I would learn the rst Mishnah of Chapter Hazzahav. If the me'ayyen [wishes] to enunciate that which is in his soul, it is appropriate that it should be by means of words which signify that which is in his soul, and that there should not be in them any super uity or lack, in such manner that his conception should be enunciated well with words which signify his intention. In any other way it is impossible for his intention to be enunciated. This may be either words which signify one intention or words which signify many intentions. An example of words which signify one intention is that in the Mishnah which is before us it says "Gold acquires silver," and the intention of these words is to make known that physically taking golden coins eVects the acquisition of silver coins. To signify that intention, he enunciated "Gold acquires silver." In truth, however, these words do not signify the intention in his soul, for there is a diVerence between, "gold acquires silver" and "physically taking golden coins acquires silver coins," which is in his soul. Now, since there is a diVerence between them, we may object that the tanna was not exacting with his language, in accordance with that which we have postulated: that one who enunciates his intention must do so with words that signify the intention of his soul, but these words do not signify the intention of his soul.
And now for words which signify many intentions. It is as if you were to say that you wish to know what was the intention of the tanna in the Mishnah, and you will say, his intention is to enumerate those things which eVect acquisition. And you will wish to make an investigation and thus say, if it is really the intention of the tanna to make known those things which eVect acquisition, are there any things in the world which eVect acquisition that he has not mentioned, or are there no things in the world which eVect acquisition except for these which he has mentioned. You must investigate whether the words which he employed are complete, lacking nothing, or did he employ them in an [in]complete fashion, and they are lacking a division 25 or divisions besides those he has mentioned.
And even if we will say that he employed them in complete fashion, and there is nothing lacking in them, it is appropriate to investigate if he added something. For example, if he articulated three subjects, and it would have been enough had he articulated one of them, and from it the others which he mentioned could have been deduced by us. It has been made clear to you from what we have said that it is appropriate to examine closely every utterance [to establish] that it has no super uity or lack but is perfect. One must examine closely, therefore, every utterance in regard to its conception, whether it contains super uity or lack in two ways: whether in words or in subjects. "In words" [means] that there are super uous words for enunciating the intention, or that they are lacking, i.e., that the enunciation does not contain the necessary words. "In subjects" [means] that there is a super uous subject, i.e., that from the law of one subject, another of them could have been understood and it is not necessary to enunciate it; or that there is another subject which could not have been understood from the law of the subject enunciated, and it was necessary to enunciate it. So we nd in the language an objection of super uity and an objection of lack. We see that the objections which occur in the conception of the language/or, in the text of the conception: bilshon hatztziyur, in general are two: either to object that he added what was not necessary or to object that he omitted what was necessary.
If you nd the language perfect with regard to its conception, having no super uity or lack, then you must perform a second investigation with regard to the language, with regard to judgment, which is the second category. And you must investigate saying, whether the conception of these words is true or untrue. And even if is true, it should not be so true that we do not need it to be made known, but that it is appropriate for it to be made known.
And if its making known is necessary, then it is appropriate to investigate; perhaps you will nd in it objections of "why," which are in regard to the speaker of falsehood, and this objection includes lying 26 because the intelligence contradicts him or because there is a
Commentary of the Spanish Exiles, I; The Method of Diaresis," in Sefunot, New Series, Vol. 2, pp. [165] [166] [167] [168] [169] [170] [171] [172] [173] [174] [175] [176] [177] [178] [179] [180] [181] [182] [183] [184] . 26 This is the technical term for speaking falsely in scholastic logic and philosophy without regard to the intention of the speaker. law in another place that is the opposite from a Mishnah or a baraita or a memra, or if he contradicts himself, whether because of what he said in another place or what he said in this place, in which case we can object: "It itself is contradictory."
From this species is the objection: "When he said it, why did he say it?," for, as we have said, he knows the Mishnah, and if he said a law which is the opposite of the Mishnah, the gemara is amazed at him; how come he said thus? Did he not know the Mishnah that contradicts him?! And likewise is the objector who asks an objection whose refutation is obvious and is known to him, the gemara is amazed at him; how come he objected thus? Did he not know the refutation which contradicts him? And it is as if he contradicts his [own] words. And similarly, one who refutes [an objection] in such a way that the objection [deriving from his very solution] is obvious and was certainly known to him, the gemara is amazed at him thus: "When he said it, why did he say it?" The principle which emerges is that the objection is on the speaker of falsehood, whether by virtue of that which is in actuu or in potentia, that is a diyyuq.
And even if it is true, perhaps you will raise an objection of "obvious." And this is in one of two cases; either it is obvious to the intelligence and it is not necessary to make it known, or he has already said it. And if it is because he already said it, it is in two cases; either he already said it in this statement itself or in another statement. And this [may be] whether he mentioned it in actuu or in potentia, namely via a diyyuq.
And if you have found the language perfect, having no objections of "why," nor objections of "obvious," afterwards you should perform a third investigation of the language, with regard to the third category, which is the order. Be careful to put your 'iyyun of the conception rst, and afterwards the judgment and afterwards the order, for the necessity of its preceding knowledge will make necessary its preceding 'iyyun. This is because preceding knowledge of the intention of the language is necessary for knowledge of the judgment, and preceding knowledge of the judgment for knowledge of the order.
And you shall investigate with respect to the order whether the words are ordered in a true order. And it is tting that you should pay attention to this in respect to words which signify one intention: for example, one might say of "gold acquires silver," that these words are in order. And not in order would be if one would say "silver acquires gold." In respect to subjects, unordered would be if you were to say that he should have enunciated Chapter Shenaim Ohazim after Chapter Elu Metsiot. And similarly in a Mishnah in which there are two clauses, where the tanna should have placed the latter clause before the former clause.
The distinction that obtains between poor ordering with respect to words that are about one intention and poor ordering with respect to subjects is that when words that signify one intention are unordered it is possible for understanding to be confounded, and even if it is not confounded, it will only be known to us after much 'iyyun and research of great eVort, and therefore the words must be ordered in a true order to guard the me'ayyen from error.
27 If the poor order is with respect to subjects, however, it will not occasion that its understanding will be confounded, and what will follow from good order with respect to subjects is the broadening of the intelligence of the me'ayyen.
The upshot is that for every language which will be investigated, there are only six types of doubts.
28 And even though the objections 29 in the Gemara are of many species and all of them can be enumerated by the faculty of division, 30 I have chosen the path of brevity, namely, that under each of these three genera, 31 there are two [species] . As for the genus of conception, they are super uity and lack. As for the genus of judgment, they are "why" and "obvious." And as for the genus of order, they are poor order in the words or the subjects that occur in the paragraph of law, which therefore also produces two divisions.
With this you may obtain all of the doubts which there can possibly be in the halakhah, 32 in this fashion:
The doubts that fall are either by way of question or by way of wonderment.
And if it is by way of question, that is, when the questioner wants to know that which is unknown to him, it is divided into two:
Either the law of the subject is unknown to him, or the reason for the law is unknown. Now as for the reason for the law being unknown to him, this may not be divided, but if the law is unknown, this may be divided into two:
Either the law is totally unknown to him, or he has before him laws which may be [decided] leniently or stringently, and he does not known whether the true law is lenient or stringent.
Now if it is the true law which is unknown to him, 33 this is divided into two possibilities.
Either the law's being lenient or stringent are equal [possibilities to the questioner], and whether the respondent responds with a leniency or a stringency, he will have no further question; or even when he answers, he will still have a question. For example: the questioner asked a question, "What is the true law, lenient or stringent?" If you will answer, "lenient," he will have no further question, 34 but if you will answer, "stringent," he will have another question. The rst type of question is when the Talmud asks one question, and the second type is when the Talmud asks many questions, according to the method of "If you will be able to say,"
35 as I will write in the second chapter on questions.
And if the doubt is by way of wonderment, this is an inclusive [category] . {Behold, I have learned this method in the method of 'iyyun, when I was studying the Mishnah.}
36
The way we can enumerate the objections by means of division is the following:
(One must know, that in any subject which lies before him, obtaining all the interpretations which are possible in it is only possible via the faculty of division. And when you begin the division, do not make more than two divisions, and then divide the two divisions each into two more, if they both are divisible. If you begin with three divisions, e.g., if you will say, "It could be this or this or this," it will be impossible for you to obtain all the interpretations which could be in the subject you are investigating.)
And this is the method of division of the doubts:
The wonderment includes all types of objections, for in every type of objection, the objector wonders and objects. 37 Now we will divide the wonderment rst into two:
Either he wonders at the speaker that he speaks a lie, or not.
If he wonders that he speaks a lie, this may be divided into two:
Either he wonders at the speaker of a lie because the intelligence contradicts him or because there is a Mishnah or a baraita or a memra 38 which contradicts.
If it is a contradiction, 39 this may be divided into two:
Either he objects from that which is actual or from that which is potential (that is, from a diyyuq).
And if he does not wonder because he is speaking a lie, this may also be divided into two:
Either he wonders that he has contradicted himself (that is, the objection of "It itself is diYcult"), 40 or not.
If he wonders that he has contradicted himself, this may be divided into two:
Either he contradicts himself in one utterance, e.g., the end of his words contradicts their beginning, or he contradicts himself from what he said in another place.
If he contradicts himself may be divided into two:
37 His point seems to be that "wonderment" is an appropriate name for the category that includes all types of objections, because this is the psychological state of the "objector." "Objector" here is, itself, a technical term for one of the two actors in the dialectic, namely the one who is attempting to refute the thesis of the "refuter."
38 These are terms for authoritative statments from either the Mishnah and related literature or from rabbis of the Talmudic period.
39 I.e., the latter case of contradiction from a text. 40 A standard talmudic dialectical term for a text which contains a contradiction.
Either he contradicts himself from that which is actual or from that which is potential.
If he contradicts himself from that which is potential, may be divided into two:
Either the diyyuq of the beginning contradicts the diyyuq of the end or not.
If not 41 is divided into two:
Either the diyyuq of the beginning contradicts that which is actual in the end, or the diyyuq of the end contradicts that which is actual in the beginning.
If he does not raise an objection that he [contradicts] himself is divided into two:
Either he objects to the objector and the answerer that the refutation of him [i.e., the refutation of his objection or his answer to an objection] is obvious, and why did the objector raise an objection whose answer is obvious and why did the answerer refute with a refutation whose objection is obvious? (and this is the objection of "When he said it, why did he say it?") 42 or he does not object in this manner.
If he does not object in this manner is divided into two:
Either he raises an objection against the choice, e.g. there is a Mishnah which contains a dispute of tannaim and of two amoraim, one decided like the rst tanna, and one decided like the second tanna, and he wonders why did one choose the rst tanna and one the second tanna, or he does not object in this fashion.
And if his does not object in this fashion is divided into two:
Either he wonders at a lack, namely the enunciator did not enunciate something that is necessary to say, or he objects to that which he did enunciate.
If he wonders at a lack is divided into two:
He wonders that there is lacking a word or words which it is necessary to say in that subject, or that a subject is lacking, and this is in a case where he did enunciate subjects and left out one that he should have said.
43 41 I.e., if it is not the case that the diyyuq of the beginning contradicts the one of the end. 42 The standard talmudic term for this type of objection. 43 That is, where the structure of the text indicates that the author wishes to be comprehensive.
Behold, I taught this method in the method of 'iyyun when I studied the Mishnah Hazzahav, in order to increase the disciples' understanding of the method of 'iyyun, 44 and in order that this method shall be absorbed in the intelligence of the scholar, I have taken the trouble to write the objections which fall in Mishnah Hazzahav.
And thus which would be this method for any Mishnah or baraita or memra, 45 to strive in 'iyyun by means of these objections. 46 For, in my opinion veri cation of the intelligible is impossible other than by means of objections, for by their means may the truth be apprehended. 47 Therefore, the scholar must seek every possible objection in order to arrive at truth.
In pursuing the objections which occur with regard to the conception, as we have prefaced, in the case of words which signify one intention, 48 we have, for example in the Mishnah, "Gold acquires silver," but the intention is to say that pulling golden dinars acquires silver dinars, 49 but this intention is not enunciated in the words of the Mishnah. This objection must be before you with regard to any interpreter of a Mishnah or a memra, or any other text, namely that if the intention is as the interpreter has said of the language, why did the [author] not conceive 50 in his language those words which would signify his intention, and it is extremely forced to assume that he should have not enunciated words which signify that intention.
51
Incline your ears to hear a principle in this matter, namely that it is important that you investigate whether the words which the commentator has written with regard to a certain utterance contradict the words that are written in that utterance or do not contradict. If they do contradict, then the objection is strengthened, for the intention is the opposite of what he interpreted. But if they do not contradict, then there is room for the commentator to interpret as he did.
In the Mishnah, in which it says, "gold," and the interpreter 52 wrote "golden dinars," "golden dinars," are not words that contradict the word "gold," for the word, "gold" includes both the minted and the unminted, and when he interprets that the intention of the Mishnah is the minted, he does not contradict the word "gold." But if you will say, in the nal analysis, he [the author of the Mishnah] ought to have said, "golden dinars," and not "gold" alone, one may answer if it were impossible to interpret the word, "gold" as referring to minted gold, then your objection would be indeed an objection, for he should have said "golden dinars." But since the force of his words is that one must interpret that he is referring to the minted, one may not object that he ought to have said "golden dinars." I will say to you, moreover, that it is the way of the tanna to be brief, and therefore he said, "gold," and did not say "golden dinars," and when something is self understood, brevity is appropriate. Now, if you will object that if it is necessary 53 to interpret that which he said, "gold" as referring to minted, then why was the interpreter obligated to write something that is self-understood? And you may raise this objection in regard to any utterance for which it appears that they words of the interpreter are not required, since the language is self-explanatory (i.e., that it refers to that intention). Now you will known and apprehend the answer to this objection, that the situation of the interpreter who comes to interpret is like the situation of one who has sharp vision as opposed to one whose vision is dull, and both of them are looking at a form inscribed. 54 For example, you could say, that the inscriber inscribed a horse on the wall, by means of lines. He did not bring material and stick it to the wall, thus forming it into the shape of a horse, but he brought a tool and with it made lines, and those lines signify a horse, even though he has not put any material inside of the lines, but left the wall as it was. Even so, it is recognizable that it is a horse, but the lines are very ne and unrecognizable to one who has dull sight, and therefore he said there is no form of a horse there. One who has sharp sight perceived that there is there the form of a horse, and in order that the dull-sighted one should perceive that there is there the form of a horse, brought a tool and broadened the lines. And then the dull-sighted one recognized what he had not before when the lines were ne. Similarly, it will happen with one whose intelligence is sharp and one whose intelligence is dull, for the one whose intelligence is dull does not perceive the intention of the enunciated 55 language, and because of the smallness of his intelligence, he errs in understanding it. The one who is sharp of intelligence interprets it in language that the dull-witted one can understand its intention.
In this case, when he has said "gold," one whose intelligence is dull does not understand that it is about golden dinars that he is speaking, but since it says "gold," he thinks that it is unminted gold. From this cause, there will result such a great confusion in his understanding that he will object that the Mishnah contradicts itself from its beginning to its end, for in the beginning it says that, "Gold acquires silver and silver does not acquire gold," but in the end it says "all chattels acquire one another," implying that also silver 54 The word "inscribed" or "engraved" used here is precisely the same word that Ibn Sid has been using for enunciation. The polysemy of the Hebrew word has certainly contributed to the making of this simile. 55 I.e., inscribed. Cf., previous note.
acquires gold. 56 Accordingly, the sharp-minded one 57 enlightened him that the beginning is referring to minted gold, and there is, therefore, no contradiction between the beginning and the end, and the Talmud is full of examples such as this.
As for that which Rashi has written, "pulling golden dinars," 58 the word, "pulling" is necessary, for if you will say that there is here no "pulling," how can there be acquisition, since the methods of acquisition are by money, document, or taking possession, as is explained in a few places, and without these there is no acquisition, and the method of acquisition of chattels is by "pulling." Therefore that which he has taught, "gold acquires," is by the method of "pulling," for that acquisition which is by money, document, or taking possession is only for real estate.
59 Now indeed, it should be clear to you when the words signify one intention.
60
Now, if the words signify many intentions, 61 that is to say, that the tanna 62 wished to make known to us all of the subjects in which acquisition is possible, it will be clear after only a little examination, that in this Mishnah there are: gold, silver, copper, invalid and valid coins, tokens and chattels, and it is clear, therefore, that he wished to make us know the methods of acquisition for many subjects. 63 Since this has been established, an investigation becomes relevant, 56 For unminted metal is a chattel like any other. 57 Rashi. 58 Having explained why Rashi interpreted that "gold" means "golden dinars," here, Ibn Sid wishes now to explain why it was necessary for Rashi to add the word "pulling," i.e., what ambiguity there is in the formulation as it is in the Mishnah, which would conceivably lead the dull-minded into error.
59 Ibn Sid's phrasing here is awkward, and he would undoubtedly have corrected it had he revised his work. Nevertheless, his point is clear, namely that we must be talking about "pulling," that is, transferring the goods into the possession of the new owner,since that is the only method of acquisition which is eVective with regard to chattels.
60 That is, it should be clear to you how to proceed in questioning and answering the adequacy of the language to the conception, when dealing with a single proposition. 61 That is, that we have a complex utterance with several propositions, and now the task is to examine the super uity or lack of propositions within the category detailed by the author. 62 Author of the mishnah. 63 That is, since the author of the Mishnah has included a variety of categories in his utterance, we may reason that the purpose of the utterance is to make known the methods of acquisition in a general way.
i.e., if there are in the world other subjects 64 aside from those he has mentioned. And if there are other subjects aside from them, namely real estate, an objection with regard to the conception of lack occurs, for the tanna did not conceive in the words which are required for all of the subjects in which there is acquisition. But perhaps there is no subject aside from the ones he has mentioned, because the intention of the tanna was not to speak of the acquisition of real estate but only of chattels, which he divided into two categories: minted chattels and unminted chattels, and he began with minted chattels and said, "gold acquires," and he ended with unminted chattels and said, "all of the chattels."
Since the minted belongs to three metals, gold and silver and copper, and in these metals it can be that the coin is perfect 65 or imperfect, therefore he began with perfect coin and said, "gold etc.," 66 and ended with the imperfect, and said "invalid coins and tokens."
And it was appropriate to begin with the perfect, for most purchases are with it. And even with the imperfect, he began with the more perfect of it, which is the invalid coins and ended with the least perfect, the token. From this you should learn that in any place where there are many subjects, one should begin with the more perfect of them, for that is the virtue of speech. accordingly, the objection of lack is raised, with regard to his teaching that "copper acquires silver," and not teaching the law of its acquisition with regard to gold.
68
And you may also raise an objection of super uity, which is also with regard to the conception, i.e., whether there is an unnecessary subject or not, 69 or if there is an unnecessary word. And in any matter that will come before you, if there is an unnecessary subject or an unnecessary division of a subject or an unnecessary law 70 or an unnecessary word. And this may be in two ways: either it has been added in actuu or it has been added because of a diyyuq. 71 And also in the case of lack, it may be that there is lacking a subject, or a division of a subject, or the law of the subject is missing, as in the example we have mentioned.
72 Or there may be lacking a word in the subject.
Similarly, with regard to the judgment, you must examine carefully whether he his speaking lies by virtue of the intelligence, 73 or by virtue of that which he has said, either in the same place or in another place, and whether the contradiction is by virtue of that which is in actuu or that which is in potentia, and in this order you should also raise the objection of obviousness.
74
Similarly with regard to the order, you must examine carefully whether the clauses are ordered appropriately and the words.
Behold, this is what it is appropriate to examine carefully whether these de ciencies or some of them appear in the Mishnah, and I did not speak at length with regard to this Mishnah, since I only put it before you in order to make known to you the methods of 'iyyun. What I have said is a guide to you for any subject which comes 68 And this is, indeed, a valid objection, for we do not know whether gold was more current legal tender than copper or not, but Ibn Sid does not answer it here, for he is only interested in exemplifying the method and not solving all of the problems of this particular text.
69 That is, a subject which is already included or implied by another one mentioned. 70 That is, the subject is necessary, but once having mentioned the law for part of it, the law for another part is implied and, therefore, unnecessary, but he mentions it anyway.
71 Linguistic implication. See discussion above in body of paper. 72 That is, the subject is mentioned, i.e., we know that there is gold, silver, copper, etc. What is not mentioned is the law for part of the subject. 73 I.e., whether it is common sense that contradicts what he is saying. 74 That is, that it is obvious by virtue of the intelligence, or by virtue of that which is said here or somewhere else and in actuu or in potentia.
before you to use the dialectical method 75 in every way possible. And in every legal passage 76 be careful to search for the objections which may be raised whether with regard to the conception, the judgment, and the order, and let all this be routine in your mouth, for in any legal passage you will require it. 75 Hebrew pilpul. 76 Halakhah, as opposed, apparently to narrative passages, aggadah.
